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CHANGES IN THE INTERESTS OF CLASSES OF
STOCKHOLDERS BY CORPORATE CHARTER
AMENDMENTS REDUCING CAPITAL, AND
ALTERING REDEMPTION, LIQUIDA-
TION AND SINKING FUND
PROVISIONS*
Arno C. Becht'
A corporate capital structure consisting of one or more classes of pre-
ferred stock, and one or more types of common stock, is familiar. The
preferred stock usually has, besides its preference in dividends, a prefer-
ence upon dissolution or liquidation of the corporation. It may also have
a conditional or unconditional contract for redemption, with or without a
contract for maintaining a sinking fund to carry out the redemption. The
effect of these provisions is to place the first risk of a shrinkage in the value
of the assets upon the common stock, which is usually compensated by
enjoying the voting control, and by a claim to the residue of the assets
without sharing the speculative profits with the senior classes. These
arrangements presumably reflect a demand for investments of particular
types. Those who prefer a small but relatively certain return, invest in
preferred stocks, while those who are willing to take speculative risks,
or who expect to profit from the exercise of control, buy common stock.
It is clear that, as between classes of stock, reductions of capital and
alterations of the redemption, liquidation and sinking fund provisions,
may shift interests in the property of the corporation from one class to
another, and may reduce or destroy the relative security for which the
purchasers of preferred stock bargain. If an amendment has this effect,
it is nearly certain that what the senior securities lose will pass to the
common stockholders. It is the purpose of this article to ascertain to
what extent such shiftings of property interests are permitted by the law,
and to consider whether the cases indicate any necessity for a change in
the law or its administration.1
* This article is one of a series submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, page 95, for biographical data.
1 Creditors, of course, have an interest in reductions of capital and redemption of stock,
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I. REiDUCTIONS OF CAPITAL
A reduction of capital may merely reflect losses which have already
occurred, and, by removing the impairment of capital, will make current
profits available for dividends. Even if a corporation has no impairment
of capital, a reduction may still be desired, so that the corporation may
continue in business on a reduced scale, using the surplus for partial
liquidation, or other purposes. So long as a reduction is charged properly
against the different classes of stock, no real change occurs in the interest
of any stockholder, and it could be argued that no express authority
should be required for it. It has nevertheless been held that a reduction
executed without authority was void against one who did not consent
to it.2 Express authorities to reduce capital, however, are very common,
and so long as the reduction is fairly distributed among the stockholders,
amendments under such authority have uniformly been sustained.3
So long as a reduction leaves each stockholder with the same propor-
since these may result in distribution to stockholders while outstanding debts go unpaid,
but such claims raise quite different problems and are not 'considered in this article, except
briefly as they may affect the enforcement of a contract to redeem.
2 Campbell v. American Zylonite Co., 122 N. Y. 455, 25 N. E. 853 (1890); see Bechtel
Trust Co. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 19 F. Supp. 127 (N. D. Ia. 1937), aff'd 98 F.
2d 416 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 U. S. 650 (1938), rehearing denied 305 U. S. 676
(1939).
3 Such amendments only change the paper description of the stockholders' rights, without
changing their actual interests in the least. Thus, in American Alkali Co. v. Campbell,
113 Fed. 398 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1902), the court, while saying that the point could not be
raised in that action, indicated its belief that a stockholders' resolution to reduce the pre-
ferred stock by three-fifths, leaving the corporation in possession of that amount for future
use, was valid, because the two-fifths was the sum actually paid in on the stock. See also
In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F. 2d 22 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 308 U. S.
622 (1940), rehearing denied, 309 U. S. 694 (1940), in which, in reorganization proceed-
ings long after the amendment, a stockholder complained of an alteration of his preferred
stock into one-sixth of a share of common stock. Since the class junior to his old preferred
was cancelled by the amendment, there was no change in his proportionate interest in the
corporation, and the court held that " . . . contract rights of the Class A holders were not
diminished by a mere reduction in the number of Class A shares outstanding, or by change
of name to common stock." 106 F. 2d, 22, 27.
In Williams v. Davis, 297 Ky. 626, 180 S. W. 2d 874 (1944), the majority voted to
reduce both the common and the preferred stock, and the court held this binding on the
plaintiff, a dissenting preferred stockholder, because it was proper, under the charter of
the corporation, to reduce both classes proportionately. See also Morganstern v. American
Malting Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 358, 100 At. 166 (Ct, Err. & App. 1917). (Common stockholder
had valid complaint against amendment that reduced common more than preferred, but the
corporation's offer to give him enough common to maintain his proportionate position
removed the ground for complaint against the amendment.)
See also Romer v. Porcelain Products Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 52, 2 A. 2d 75 (Ch. 1938), in
which the amendment reduced both the preferred and the common stock by one half. The
court held for the defendant on the ground of laches, but indicated that the amendment
had not affected the property interests of the stockholders, because everyone held equal
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tionate interest as against others of his own and different classes, no
property interest of his is affected by the amendment, and consequently
a subsequent statute authorizing reduction in this way would not offend
either the due process or the contracts clause. The question has seldom
arisen. In Heller Investment Co. v. Southern Title and Trust Co.,4 a
corporation having only common stock reduced the stock by three-tenths
.and authorized a new prior stock. In a dissenting stockholder's suit to
compel the corporation to issue new common to him, share for share
for his old, the court held that a subsequent statute authorizing the
amendment was a proper exercise of the reserved power. The plaintiff
claimed that the statute violated the due process clause, to which the
court replied that the contracts clause would be a more appropriate pro-
vision, but held that there was no objection under either clause. In the
only other case found dealing with the constitutional question as between
classes of stock, the court's language seems to go beyond its decision. The
corporation, acting under a subsequent statute, proposed to retire its
preferred stock by issuing bonds of the same value in lieu of it.' To the
claim that this changed the relative proportions of the different securities,
the court replied that such amendments were permitted under the re-
served power:
... it must be held that, although the result of carrying out the alteration
provided for in the act of 1902 may be to change, to some extent, the rela-
tions of the different security holders to each other, such statute is not
obnoxious to the provisions of the constitution forbidding the passage of
laws impairing the obligations of contracts.6
Although the court in this passage evidently intended to hold that the
state could alter the relations of the security holders, the actual amend-
ment did not disturb the seniority of the preferred stock; the case then
would be a poor precedent for a subsequent statute authorizing such
changes.
The power to reduce capital usually is general in terms, without pro-
vision that the reduction shall be fair among the classes. Yet, numerous
cases have recognized the need for equitable limitations on such powers,
as otherwise the class with the most voting power could charge losses
entirely against the others. Thus, in Kennedy v. Carolina Public Service
numbers of shares of both classes except the plaintiff, who had transferred all of his com-
mon, but only part of his preferred, to his wife.
The same principle applies to increases in the number of common shares. See Falk v. Diri-
gold Corp., 174 Minn. 219, 219 N. W. 82 (1928).
4 17 Cal. App. 2d 202, 61 P. 2d 807 (1936).
5 Venner Co. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 116 Fed. 1012 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1902).
6 116 Fed. 1012, 1014 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1902). The court did not say whether the
objecting stockholder held preferred or common stock, but its reasoning is only consistent
with his holding common stock.
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Co.,7 the amendment reduced the preferred stock by two-fifths, and the
common stock only by one-fifth. The court, in a suit by preferred
stockholders, annulled the amendment on the ground that a general
power to reduce capital did not authorize disproportionate charges against
different classes of stock:
.. *Unless the corporation happened to be entirely unable to pay its pre-
ferred stock on dissolution, such action would amount to a gift by the
meeting from the property belonging to the preferred stockholders to the
common stockholders, and a gift until dissolution of a corresponding in-
terest in the earnings of the corporation. As regards the dommon stock-
holders, the preferred stockholder is really an incumbrancer on the assets
of the corporation, and so remarkable a power could hardly have been
intended to be given a stockholders' meeting."
The court, however, went on to hold that even if the reduction had been
proportionate it should have been enjoined because the preferred stock
could only be reduced by payment of the redemption price. But, if the
terms of the two classes of stock were such that a proportionate reduc-
tion would have been fair, it seems that the redemption provision should
not have applied; the majority was not trying to buy in the stock, but
merely to make the books reflect the condition of the capital accurately.
Hence, it is submitted that the second reason for the decision is objection-
able, although the result is sound.
Admitting that a reduction must be "fair", there is often great diffi-
culty in deciding upon a just division among different classes of stock.
Three things must be looked to-dividends, liquidation preferences, and
voting power. If the prior class is preferred in dividends and assets, a
reduction charged entirely against the common stock would be proper,
so far as assets and earnings are concerned. If the corporation should
recoup its losses, the common stock would still take everything after the
preferences of the senior class were satisfied. But the reduction would
cut down the voting power of the common stock, would perhaps even
cost it control; yet control is part of the reason for taking a subordinate
interest in assets, and may be worth something when the interest in
assets is not. For this reason the court in Page v. American and British
Mfg. Co.,9 enjoined an amendment which charged all of an impairment
of capital against the common stock, when the preferred had priority both
in dividends and in assets:
The capital stock of a corporation may be increased or reduced as
authorized by statute, but in the absence of express statutory provision the
7 262 Fed. 803 (N. D. Ga. 1920).
8 Id. at 805.
9 129 App. Div. 346, 113 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1st Dep't 1908).
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right of the individual stockholder to the proportionate voice in the conduct
of the affairs of the corporation and equitable interest in its property which
his stock gives him when he becomes a stockholder must be preserved.
The interest of the plaintiff in the property if dissolution were to take place
now might not be affected by the action taken because on dissolution the
preferred stock was first to be paid in full, but the right of a stockholder
to a voice in the management of a corporation in which he has invested
money is a property right and vested interest entitled to protection under
the Constitution . . . if the stock be reduced, a reduction must be upon
lines which will leave each stockholder the same proportionate interest and
right in the corporation as he had before the reduction. If, therefore, the
capital stock be divided into preferred and common stock, there must
be a reduction of both in the proportion that the issue of each bears to
the other. It may be that there can be no reduction of preferred stock.
If so, there can be no reduction as to common stock without unanimous
consent, and in such case the general authority to reduce capital stock
should be held not to be applicable.' 0
In Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co.," the facts were similar except that the
preferred stock, besides preferences in dividends and assets, had a right
to participate in dividends after both classes had been paid 6% in a
given year. The amendment reduced the common stock from 8,000 to
1,000 shares, and then provided for an increase to 4,000 shares by
issuing 3,000 shares to the stockholders for cash. The court sustained the
amendment, saying:
. .. The plan, while not so expressed in terms, operates as a partial liqui-
dation which would have to be borne equally by both classes of stock if
the preference had been limited only to dividends. . . . But the common
stock cannot participate in any distribution of assets until the stipulated
priority of the preferred stock as to both dividends and assets has been
satisfied. If by the shrinkage of quick assets or of working capital, even
if not sufficient to cause general liquidation, new capital must be raised
by first reducing the outstanding capital and then increasing it within the
authorized limit, the common stock, which under the contract assumed
the burden, must be first resorted to even to the point of extinction before
the preferred stock can be compelled to contribute.12
Both of these courts, then, recognized equitable limitations on the
power to reduce capital, the second as much as the first; the difference
was only that the second court did not consider the voting power a rele-
vant factor in determining fairness. Even this may have been due to
failure to argue the point, for the court did not mention it in the opinion.
If the view of the first Page case is taken, reductions of capital when
there is more than one class of stock, will be difficult, since the preferred
stock cannot be reduced at all without taking its dividend and asset
10 Id. at 348-9, 113 N. Y. Supp. at 735-6.
11 211 Mass. 424, 97 N. E. 1006 (1912).
12 Id. at 428, 97 N. E. at 1007-8.
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preferences pro tanto, while the common stock cannot be reduced alone
without taking its voting power. The amendment could increase the
voting power of each remaining share of common stock, so that it re-
tained its proportionate voting strength, but this solution would cause
trouble if the corporation should later wish to issue more common stock
to the public. Either the new common shares would have greater voting
power than they deserved proportionately to the preferred stock, or there
would be two classes of common stock with different voting powers. In
many cases the preferred stock has no voting power; then it would not
matter how much the voting power of the common stock was reduced.
Hence, if there is power to reduce or remove the voting power of the
preferred stock, this might be used to leave the common stock in control.
A recent decision suggests another possible solution, if the common stock-
holders can be induced to support it. The corporation in Hay v. Big Bend
Land Co., 3 had a six per cent cumulative preferred stock which was en-
titled to a preference of par ($100) and accrued dividends on dissolu-
tion. The amendment, inter alia, reduced the par value of each share of
common stock from $100 to ten dollars. At the suit of a party who held
a small amount of preferred stock and a larger amount of common, the
court held that this reduction of the common stock was fair, because the
preferred stock had a priority in assets. 4 This device, of course, avoided
any effect upon the voting power of the common stockholders, and so was
unobjectionable on that ground; nor would it affect the amount any
common stockholder would receive on dissolution, since the preferred
stock was limited to its priority. 5
In Hildreth v. Western Realty Co.,16 the reduction threatened the de-
struction of the voting power of the preferred stock. The latter was en-
titled to 6% cumulative dividends and to share in further dividends
after the common had been paid 6% in any year. It was redeemable at
the option of the corporation at par and accrued dividends. The direc-
tors proposed to use a large surplus to redeem preferred stock without
paying the accrued dividends on the redeemed shares, but leaving them
still owing. The plan would have transferred control to the common
stock. At the suit of a preferred stockholder, the court held that while
13 32 Wash. (2d) 887, 204 P. 2d 488 (1949).
14 The court indicated that the authorities left it in some doubt how this reduction
should be charged against the two classes of stock, but finally concluded that the amend-
ment should be sustained, even though the reduction was greater than necessary to remove
the impairment of capital.
15 For discussion of other provisions of the amendment see p. 7 and note 17, infra.
16 62 N. D. 233, 242 N. W. 679 (1932).
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normally a reduction should have been enforced against both classes
equally, reduction of the preferred stock was proper in this case because
the corporation had been formed for the purpose of winding up another;
the preferred stockholders were in fact creditors who had taken stock for
their claims. It held, however, that the money could not be used to
retire shares without paying the accrued dividends on them, so as to in-
crease the number of shares retired and turn the control over to the
common stock before the accrued dividends had been paid. The court
rested this result on construction of the charter, but it seems an equally
clear case of imposing equitable limitations on a power to reduce capital.
The Hay case reached the same result, holding that redemption of the
preferred shares without prejudice to the right to accrued dividends but
without paying them, would unfairly reduce the voting power of the
preferred stockholders.'
The only case which appears not to recognize an equitable limitation
on the power to reduce capital, is Ecker v. Kentucky Refining Co.,'"
which is perhaps explainable on other grounds. A preferred stockholder
objected to an amendment reducing the common stock from $1,000,000
to $200,000 and the preferred from $600,000 to $200,OQO. If the pre-
ferred stock had priority in dividends and assets, all the loss should have
been charged against the common stock, with some provision for main-
taining its voting strength. If the preferred stock had priority only as
to dividends, its dividends ought not to have been reduced, but its liqui-
dation rights should have been. That perhaps could have been accom-
plished by reducing its par value, while stating its dividend priority in
terms of dollars per year. The court sustained the amendment simply on
the ground that the statutory power to reduce capital had been strictly
followed, which may mean either that the court did not recognize an
equitable obligation, or that the objection was not argued. In a later
case, Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co.,'9 the corporation worked out
the equities in drafting the amendment, and the court sustained it. The
preferred stock had a par value of $100, a redemption price of $107.50
and a cumulative dividend of 6Y2 %. The amendment reduced the capital
by cutting the par value of the preferred stock to $25, but it provided for
a $6.50 annual dividend and did not alter the redemption price. Assuming
17 Hay v. Big Bend Land Co., 32 Wash. 2d 887, 204 P. 2d 488 (1949), discussed on an-
another point, p. 6 supra. See also note 14 supra. There was another reason for the result
in this case, as the plan of redemption included installment payments for the redeemed
shares, and the court held it objectionable for this reason also.
18 144 Ky. 264, 138 S. W. 264 (1911).
19 260 Ky. 261, 84 S. E. 2d 84 (1935).
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that the liquidation rights of the preferred stock were the same as the re-
demption rights, the amendment did not disturb any of its priorities.2 0
Another problem in equitable limitations arises when the purpose of
the reduction is to remove an impairment of capital in order to make
dividends possible for both classes of stock. Senior stock may claim that
the whole original amount of capital must be built up in order to restore
its security, before any dividends should be paid, and that the reduction
is an avoidance of this obligation. There is little authority on the ques-
tion and that little seems to be in conflict. The preferred stockholder in
the Haggard case made the objection, but the court held that this was a
legitimate purpose of the amendment. Two New York decisions seem
to be contrary, at least in policy. In Matter of Kinney,21 the amendment
provided for voluntary exchange of each share of old preferred for one
and one-third shares of new prior preferred, while the common stock was
reduced from a stated value of $10 to $1 per share, creating a surplus
of almost a million and a half dollars. The Court of Appeals held that
the amendment altered the "preferential rights" of the preferred stock-
holders, and entitled them'to an appraisal. The transfer to surplus, it said,
would permit the use of the money for dividends or for the purchase of
stock, thereby reducing the assets upon which the preferred stock relied
for earning power and security. Again, in Rochester Gas and Electric
Coep. v. Maltbie,2" the court sustained an order of the state public service
commission, which refused a utility permission to transfer $3,000,000
from capital to a "contingency reserve", since the funds might be
used for dividends if carried in the latter account, thus reducing the
security of the preferred stock. These cases might be distinguished
from the Haggard case on the ground that the Kinney case was merely
a construction of the appraisal law while the Rochester case concerned
the regulatory powers of the public service commission. But they both
rest on the notion that the original capital must not be used for dividends
so long as the preferred stock is outstanding. The applicable statutes in
these cases, however, authorized reductions of capital; such statutes
seem contrary to an implied duty to preserve the original capital intact
20 In Williams v. Davis, 297 Ky. 626, 180 S. W. 2d 874 (1944), the court sustained an
amendment which reduced the preferred stock, on the ground that the reduction was
properly proportionately enforced against the preferred and common alike. Since the rights
of the preferred stock were not stated, it is impossible to compare this case with the others.
21 279 N.Y. 423, 18 N.E. 2d 645 (1939), reversing 254 App. Div. 660, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 377
(1st Dep't 1938).
22 258 App. Div. 682, 18 N.Y. S. 2d 630 (3d Dep't 1940), reversing 172 Misc. 359, 15
N.Y. S. 2d 163 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1939), aff'd without opinion, 284 N.Y. 626, 29
N. E. 2d 936 (1940).
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when the stated majorities vote to reduce it. Accordingly, it is submitted
that the Haggard case is the better authority, in the absence of express
covenant.
Reductions of capital offer opportunities to force an exchange of shares
with effects on other interests of the stockholders, for example, on accrued
dividends. In all but one of the cases, neither the court nor the parties
considered the reduction problem, and they are valueless as precedents.24
In the one case, Lazear v. American Steel Foundries,25 the New Jersey
court sustained an amendment which reduced the capital and required
the exchange of each share of preferred stock for 77% of its par value
in common stock, 20% in debentures, and $3 in cash. The court held
the amendment compulsory and binding in spite of the conversion of
preferred to common, because the statute for reduction of capital had
been followed. The decision also rests on laches, which may explain it.
Certainly the New Jersey court has not in other cases permitted rigid
construction of amendment powers to the detriment of preferred stock-
holders.2"
In summary, the courts are agreed that equitable limitations should
be applied to reductions of capital, although there is difficulty in deter-
mining what constitutes "fairness" in a given case. By altering par values
and voting rights, and by expressing dividends in amounts instead of
percentages, reductions can almost always be executed without shifting
23 But see comment on the Kinney case, 39 CoL. L. REv. 1037 (1939), approving the
result on the ground that maintenance of the original capital is necessary to protect the
prior stock's interest in assets and dividends. See also Comment, 52 HARv. L. REV. 1011
(1939).
24 See Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug Corp. 95 F. 2d 172 (5th Cir. 1938); Harr v.
Pioneer Mechanical Corp. 2 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), mod., 65 F. 2d 332 (2d Cir.
1933) cert. denied 290 U.S. 673 (1933); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F.
Supp. 639 (D. C. Md. 1939), aff'd 112 F. 2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); Sander v. Janssen Dairy
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 512 (D. C. N. J. 1940); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 134 N. J. Eq.
359, 35 A. 2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944), affirming 133 N. J. Eq. 214, 31 A. 2d 200 (Ch.
1943); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 135 N. J. Eq. 506, 39 A. 2d 431 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1944), affirming 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A. 2d 215 (Ch. 1944); Roberts v. Roberts-
Wicks Co., 184 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 13 (1906), reversing 102 App. Div. 118, 92 N.Y. Supp.
387 (4th Dep't 1905).
25 86 N. J. Eq. 252, 98 At!. 642, and 100 At. 1030 (for the unofficial report of the dissent-
ing opinion) (Ct. Err. & App. 1916), affirming 86 N. J. Eq. 21 (Ch. 1915) (opinion of lower
court reported in 98 Atl. 642).
26 The New Jersey courts have for example regularly protected accrued dividends against
alteration by charter amendment. Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile
Marine Co. 101 N.J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 50 (Ch. 1927); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp.,
134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A. 2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944), affirming 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31
A. 2d 200 (Ch. 1943); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 135 N.J. Eq. 506, 39 A. 2d 431
(Ct. Err. & App. 1944), affirming 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A. 2d 215 (Ch. 1944).
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property between classes. So long as the reduction is fair, it seems the
better view to permit it for the purpose of making dividends available
to both classes of stock, even though it reduces the amount of assets pro-
tecting the preferred stock, unless there is an express covenant to the
contrary.
II. REDEMPTION OF STOCK27
An issue of stock often contains a promise by the corporation to
redeem on a certain day or on certain contingencies. Whatever may be
said about dividend rates and accrued dividends, it seems that such a
promise is clearly a binding contract within the contracts clause; the
rights which it gives the stockholder might properly be held property
within the due process clause as well. Yet, since performance of such
contracts might result in the preference of stockholders over creditors,
state interference for the protection of creditors seems justified. But it
is certainly more questionable whether the state has sufficient interest in
such contracts to alter -them for the benefit of other stockholders or the
corporation.
The decisions leave no room for doubt that redemption agreements
are enforceable contracts. Assuming that no injury to creditors is threat-
ened by redemption, the courts have permitted stockholders to compel
it.28 But, if the provision does not prescribe the assets out of which the
redemption shall be made, there is an ambiguity: the corporation may
contend that it cannot be compelled to redeem if it has to liquidate all
or part of its property in order to do so. It seems unlikely that common
stockholders would contract for redemption on such terms, and yet, the
redemption provision shows that the preferred stockholders were bargain-
ing for an extraordinary protection. In Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Bur-
nett,' the Kentucky court held the contract enforceable, although the
corporation would be forced to sell its assets in order to discharge the
obligation. The court expressly rejected an argument that the contract
should be construed as calling for redemption only out of surplus. The
New Jersey court also has permitted enforcement, although it required
27 See generally, Notes, 27 CoL. L. REv. 587 (1927); 83 U. PA. L. RaV. 888 (1935);
Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 McH. L.
RaV. 743 at 772 (1934).
2 Affeldt v. Dudley Paper Co., 306 Mich. 39, 10 N.W. 2d 299 (1943); Ammon v.
Cushman Motor Works, 128 Neb. 357, 258 N.W. 649 (1935); Rowan v. Texas Orchard
Dev. Co., 181 S.W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), app. for writ of error refused, 190 S.W.
XVI (1916).
29 176 Ky. 188, 195 S. W. 477 (1917). See also Gunther Grocery Co. v. Hazel, 179 Ky.
775, 201 S.W. 336 (1918). But see Smith v. Southern Foundry Co. 166 Ky. 208, 179 S.W.
205 (1915).
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partial liquidation by sale of the stock of a subsidiary.!' The Massachu-
setts court, on the other hand, in Crimmins and Peirce v. Kidder Peabody
Corp.,31 indicated the possibility of a different view. The corporation had
issued class A preferred for the assets of another corporation, and had
sold class B preferred for cash. Both classes were redeemable, but class
B had an option to compel redemption, which a large number of its
holders exercised. Holders of class A sued to enjoin the redemption be-
cause it would leave a surplus too small for the redemption of their
shares. The court held that considering the origin of the two classes of
stock, it was proper to permit the redemption of class B, but by expressly
noting that there was no allegation that the redemption would prevent
the corporation from continuing its business, the court apparently in-
tended to reserve that question. Since it is easy to draft around this
difficulty, it is unlikely that it will become important in litigation.
A similar question may arise when shares of the same class are re-
deemable in series. In Miller v. Smith Building Co.,3 2 the corporation
issued preferred stock, contracting to redeem different series at different
dates. After doing business for a time the corporation suffered losses, so
that, after payment of its debts, there were not sufficient assets to pay
all the preferred stock. Holders of series maturing later, sued for the
appointment of a receiver and to establish that all the preferred shares
were entitled to share equally in the remaining assets. The court granted
the relief, reasoning that the earlier maturing stock had a preference over
the rest only in earnings, and that a reasonable construction of the con-
tract required equal sharing by all the series if payment were to be made
out of capital. This result seems correct, since the various issues had
not bargained for priority over each other, and the different maturity
dates were predicated on the corporation's staying in business.
Occasionally the objection to redemption comes from stockholders who
are unwilling to give up their shares on the terms provided in the contract.
Thus, in Hackett v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,3 the preferred stock was
subject to retirement at the option of the company at any time within
twenty years. The corporation proposed to retire preferred stock and
to issue common stock, with pre-emptive rights for the common stock-
holders. The court held that the plaintiff, a preferred stockholder, had
30 Mueller v. Kraeuter & Co., Inc., 131 N.J. Eq. 475, 25 A. 2d 874 (Ch. 1942). But
shares redeemable on contingency need not be redeemed where the contingency has not
happened. Farrish-Stafford Co. v. Charlotte Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 188, 72 S. E. 973 (1911).
31 282 Mass. 367, 185 N.E. 383 (1933).
82 118 Neb. 5, 223 N. W. 277 (1929). See Comment, 8 NEB. L. B. 308 (1930).
33 36 Misc. 583, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1087 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1901).
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no valid objection to this plan, because he had contracted for retirement,
and had no foundation for his claim of pre-emptive rights. A more ques-
tionable result was reached in Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,3 4 in which the
corporation had issued two classes of common stock. Class A had a
cumulative dividend of $3.20; the class B then took $1.60 per share, and
thereafter both classes shared equally. On liquidation class A was to
receive twice as much as class B, but class A was callable at $60 per
share and accrued dividends. When the corporation had a very large
surplus the directors, dominated by the holder of a majority of the
class B shares, voted to redeem the A stock. The court permitted a holder
of class A shares to recover the difference between the call price and the
amount receivable on liquidation, on the ground that the directors had
exercised the call privilege in violation of their duty to all the stock-
holders. Seldom does the preferred stockholder in these cases receive
more than he should; but the call provision is put into charters to deter-
mine the price at which the senior stock may be liquidated. Hence this
decision seems to deprive the common stockholders of the speculative
profit for which they bargained when they took a subordinate position.3 5
The courts' treatment of these provisions as contracts accords with
the intention of the parties, but for obvious reasons a great majority of
courts, sometimes aided by statute, have held that they are unenforce-
able against the corporation if it would endanger the rights of creditors.3
34 162 F. 2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), reversing 63 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. Del. 1945).
35 A similar and very interesting problem was presented in Starring v. American Hair
and Felt Co., 21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 Atl. 887 (Ch. 1937), aff'd on opinion below, 21 Del. Ch.
431, 2 A.2d 249 (Sup. 1937), but the case unfortunately went off on other grounds. The
corporation had two classes of preferred stock and one class of common with sole voting
power. There were about 160,000 shares of common stock, and about 40,000 of these had
come into the hands of non-tanners. The common stock was redeemable at book value,
but not less than $5 or more than $100 per share. The corporation proposed to redeem the
common stock in order to keep control in the hands of tanners. The court enjoined the
redemption on the ground that under the Delaware statute there was no power to redeem
a common stock. The corporation contended that the action was a reduction of capital,
but the court nevertheless enjoined the action, on the ground, inter alia, that the shares to
be taken had not been chosen by lot in accordance with the statute. Had the power to
redeem existed, the problem would have been similar to that in the Zahn case, i.e., whether
the redemption could be enforced for the benefit of the majority. It seems again that to
deny redemption would take away part of the contract for which the majority bargained.
36 In re Hicks-Fuller Co., 9 F. 2d 492 (8th Cir. 1925). But this seems to contradict the
Iowa decisions; see Allen v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 189 Iowa 731, 179 N.W. 130 (1920);
Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. 2d 643 (6th Cir. 1929); Rider v. Delker &
Sons Co., 145 Ky. 634, 140 S. W. 1011 (1911); McIntyre v. Bement's Sons, 146 Mich. 74,
109 N.W. 45 (1906); Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 137 Minn. 7, 162 N.W. 677 (1917);
S. C., 142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307 (1919) ; Culver v. Reno Real Estate Co., 91 Pa. 367
(1879) ; Warren v. Queen & Co., 240 Pa. 154, 87 At. 595 (1913); Reagan Bale Co. v.
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A minority have held that the redeeming stockholder is entitled to equality
with general creditors. 37 The best explanation of the majority view is
found in this extract from Booth v. Union Fibre Co.,8 in which the court
held that the corporation was insolvent and that the redemption pro-
vision therefore could not be enforced:
The question has not often arisen. It is directly or substantially held
in well considered cases that the obligation of the corporation to redeem
will not be enforced after it has become insolvent and its capital stock
depleted, and its refusal will not in such a situation constitute a breach of
its agreement to redeem, though it is not in liquidation, and though no
creditor is asking for relief. . . Some are put upon the ground that the
promise to redeem is conditional on the solvency of the corporation when
the time to redeem comes; or that preferred stockholders are not entitled
as against creditors to prior payment except from profits; or that the prop-
erty of the corporation cannot lawfully be used in retiring stock when debts
exist and insolvency is impending; or loosely upon the ground that a pay-
ment to stockholders in such a situation is against public policy. Such hold-
ings harmonize with G. S. 1913, sec. 6450, which is directed against the
distribution of the assets of a manufacturing corporation until the creditors
are paid, or the payment of a dividend when the corporation is insolvent.
We accept the doctrine of these cases as sound and applicable, and hold
that under the circumstances disclosed by the record the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover.39
Hence, in most courts, either no legislative action is necessary to pro-
tect creditors, or the legislation already exists; in minority view states
the legislature should have power to prevent injury to creditors through
redeemable stock. But a general power to alter redemption provisions
could be used to the great damage of preferred stockholders, when there
is in fact no risk to creditors. For example, a majority might vote to
deny redemption in order to keep the money of the preferred stock-
holders in the business to increase the earnings of the common stock.
It seems that the state has no interest in this matter sufficient to answer
the preferred stockholders' complaint that their money is kept subject
to risks, longer than they bargained for when investing. No decision has
been found on the exact point. Conversely, if a corporation has power
to redeem one class of stock, thus giving the other class an opportunity
to become the sole owners of the business, the latter also has an interest
which seems entitled to protection under the due process and contracts
Heuermann, 149 S.W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); see Mueller v. Kraeuter & Co., Inc.,
131 N.J. Eq. 475, 25 A.2d 874 (Ch. 1942).
37 Butler v. Beach, 82 Conn. 417, 74 Atl. 748 (1909) ; Allen v. Northwestern Mfg. Co.,
supra note 36; Keyes v. Blue Bell Medicine Co., 34 S. D. 297, 148 N. W. 505 (1914).
38 142 Minn. 127, 171 N.W. 307 (1919). (For the opinion upholding the sufficiency of
the complaint in this case, see 137 Minn. 7, 162 N. W. 677 (1917).)
39 142 Minn. 127, 131, 171 N. W. 307, 309 (1919).
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clauses. Admitting that the minority should be bound by an election of
the majority not to redeem at a particular time, it seems. that the state
lacks sufficient interest in the matter to justify its authorizing a majority
of the non-redeemable class to give up the redemption provision al-
together. But the only decision in point is the other way. In Davis v.
Louisville Gas and Electric Co.,40 the court sustained a subsequent statute
authorizing an amendment that reduced the dividend rate on one class
and made the other irredeemable. The argument for this amendment
was that the corporation wished to raise money by making the redeem-
able class more attractive. However, it seems questionable to put the
burden of financing on one class, while the other obtains the benefit.4 '
The courts are divided on the question whether, in the absence of con-
stitutional objections, a dissenting stockholder can maintain an action
to compel redemption of his shares although a majority of his class has
voted not to enforce the redemption provision. One court has held that
he may, at least when the vote of the majority was taken after the re-
demption contract had matured.42 Another court has reached the same
result without such a limitation.4 3 The Wisconsin court has indicated
that an amendment changing a contract for redemption on a particular
date to a contract for redemption at the option of the corporation was not
binding on a dissenter, but the court refused redemption because the pay-
ment would have endangered creditors.44 On the other hand, in King v.
Ligon,45 the South Carolina court held that a power to impose conditions
or attach penalties to a class by a two-thirds vote, authorized an amend-
40 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtI. 654 (Ch. 1928). Compare Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco
Co., 295 Ky. 226, 173 S.W. 2d 377 (1943), holding that after the directors had voted to
redeem a callable stock they had no power, as against a subordinate class, later to iriake
the redemption optional with the holders of the redeemable class.
41 The broad construction of the reserved power in the Davis case and the court's
justification of the amendment are criticized in another article of this series. Becht, Corpo-
rate Charter Amendments: Issues of Prior Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50
CoL. L. REv. 900 (1950).
42 Affeldt v. Dudley Paper Co., 306 Mich. 39, 10 N. W. 2d 299 (1943).
43 Savannah Real Estate, etc., Co. v. Silverberg, 108 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. 908 (1899).
44 Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N.W. 130'(1930). Some doubt is
thrown on the authority of this case by Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566,
280 N.W. 688 (1938), in which the court sustained an amendment which reduced the
dividend rate on preferred stock, and reduced its sinking fund provision. The majority
distinguished the Koeppler case on the ground that the contract for redemption and the
date of redemption were indorsed on the stock certificates, creating a hybrid security with
some of the attributes of a debt. The dissenting judges in the Johnson case were of the
opinion that it effectually overruled the Koeppler case. The majority's distinction certainly
throws some doubt on the binding quality of a redemption provision which is simply char-
acteristic of the class and not specially indorsed on the certificates.
45 180 S. C. 224, 185 S. E. 305 (1936).
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ment which removed a contract for redemption. Since the corporation
was in receivership at the time of the action, the same result could have
been reached without affirming the amendment. Hence, most of the very
few cases are against permitting a majority to affect these provisions.
The same considerations would apply to an amendment which post-
poned the date of redemption, for this also is a vital change in the con-
tract. If the amendment does not bind dissenters, they, of course, take
priority over those who approve.4" The Michigan court has held that
language saving vested rights in a subsequent statute authorizing charter
amendments, would prevent postponement of the date of redemption
against a dissenter:
• ..Assuming, as we fairly may, that in the absence of the redemption
provision plaintiff would not have purchased his stock, or that defendant's
undertaking to redeem was an inducing cause in consequence of which
plaintiff did purchase, the provision for redemption was something more
than a mere incident to corporate relationship, it was a definite contractual
undertaking, the proposal for which antedated and consummation of which
coincided with the purchase of the stock by plaintiff, who prior to that
time was not identified with the corporation. This being true, appellee's
contention above noted is not tenable.47
The redemption price of a class of stock is at least as important as any
other part of the redemption contract; alterations of this term so ob-
viously shift property interests among classes, that one would expect the
courts to be as hostile to them as to other changes in the contract. Oddly
enough, the few cases sustain alterations of the price term, thereby rais-
ing doubts of the trend shown in the other cases. In Morris v. American
Public Utilities Co.,4" the statutes at the time of tihe charter provided
that the preferred stock should be subject to redemption at such price,
not below par, "as may be expressed in the certificate of incorporation or
any amendment thereof." The court sustained an amendment which re-
duced the redemption price from $105 to $100, on the ground that it
was authorized by this language. But the inference is almost irresistible
that the statute was intended to permit an amendment of the charter to
state the redemption price of a new class created by that amendment.49
46 Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. 2d 643 (6th Cir. 1929). The amendment,
however, was apparently voluntary, those willing to accept the postponed date merely
exchanging their shares for others with the new date. But concerning the priority given to
those whose shares matured earlier, contrast Miller v. Smith Building Co., 118 Neb. 5, 223
N.W. 277 (1929), discussed supra, pp. 11 et seq.
47 Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 209-10, 267 N.W. 815, 818 (1936).
See approving comment, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 323 (1936); disapproving comment, 4 UNiv.
Cm. L. REV. 139 (1936).
48 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923).
49 The preferred stockholders can, of course, protect themselves in Delaware by increasing
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Again, in Transportation Co. v. Daugherty,," the court, without any con-
sideration of the powers conferred in the charter or the statutes, indicated
that it would sustain an amendment that reduced the call price of the
preferred stock from $50 to $30, on the sole ground that the larger price
was based on an overvaluation of the corporation's property. However,
if that valuation, without actionable mistake or fraud, was the basis used
by the stockholders in bargaining for their rights, it seems immaterial
that it was higher than the facts warranted.
On the whole, most of the few courts which have passed on the ques-
tion do not permit removal of the redemption feature, or postponement
of the date, so long as the rights of creditors are not affected, but these
decisions do not square with those which permit alteration of the price,
-at least as vital a change as the others. There is no judicial considera-
tion of the inconsistent results which are being reached. If there is reason
to criticize the destruction of accrued dividends, for example, there is at
least equally good reason to contend that the redemption rights of the
preferred stock should be beyond reach of the majority.
The final problem in the redemption of stock is whether the majority
has power to make a non-redeemable stock redeemable. There are at
least two reasons why such power should be denied. The first is that the
preferred stockholders, if there is no provision for redemption of those
shares, have presumably taken their stock in the belief that they are
embarked for the whole voyage and are entitled to share in all the fruits
of it. This is especially persuasive if the preferred stock has a right to
participate in dividends or assets beyond its stated preferences, but even
if it has not, the dividend rate may be generous and the security safer
than could be purchased elsewhere with the money. It is unlikely that
the common stockholders or the management would think of redemption
at all, unless the corporation was unusually prosperous. The second
reason is, that the redemption must be at a rate, and to permit that rate
to be set by the methods usual in amendment cases would be to make
the minority accept a price fixed by the majority. Such subject matter
seems singularly unpromising for solution by charter amendment. The
only reason that readily appears for permitting such amendments is, that
the corporation might be able thereby to make the junior securities more
the majority necessary for amendment by express charter provision. Sellers v. Joseph Ban-
croft & Sons Co., 23 Del. Ch. 13, 2 A. 2d 108 (Ch. 1938) (prelim. hearing); 17 A. 2d 831
(Ch. 1941) (final hearing). But compulsory reduction of the redemption price, brought
about by a sale of all assets, was sustained in United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F. 2d
923 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. denied 295 U.S. 751 (1935).
50 74 Cal. App. 2d 604, 169 P. 2d 470 (1946).
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valuable for the purpose of raising money by public sale. This, however,
puts the whole burden on the preferred stock, which in effect is forced
to get out of the corporation so that financing can be managed in the
interest of the common stockholders. True policy considerations in favor
of such amendments are as difficult to find as those supporting the elimi-
nation of accrued dividends.
Except when the nature of the corporate property is such that eminent
domain is applicable, 1 no case has been found sustaining an amendment
which made non-redeemable stock redeemable. The Georgia court has
held one such change invalid on the old-fashioned ground that it was a
reduction of capital and therefore a fundamental change which required
unanimous consent.52 The New York appellate division, in Breslav v.
New York and Queens Electric Light and Power Co.,' held that a power
to classify and reclassify stock did not authorize an amendment making
preferred stock redeemable at $105, less than its actual value, and that
if so construed, the subsequent statute conferring the power would
violate both the contracts and the due process clauses: 4
* Generally, when it is proposed to exchange new stock for old, a dis-
senting stockholder has the right to accept the new stock and remain a
stockholder or retire and receive the value of his stock. Plaintiff has no
such choice. She must get out of the corporation. The majority has so
decreed. The statute does not vest the majority with any such power. To
hold it does is tn hold the majority enjoys a right tantamount to the sov-
ereign right of eminent domain. Defendants are attempting, under the
guise of classification or reclassification of the preferred stock, to impair
the obligation of plaintiff's contract with the corporation and to divest
plaintiff of her present vested and permanent interest in the corporation.55
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently reached the same result in Yukon
Mill & Grain Co. v. Vose,56 in which the plaintiff held a preferred stock
issued at a time when neither the charter nor the statutes made provision
51 It has been held that shares in a public utility operated by the state can be condemned
under the eminent domain power if their holders do not assent to the terms of an exchange.
Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 523, 159 N.E. 55 (1927) ; Opinion of the Justices, 261
Mass. 556, 159 N.E. 70 (1927).
52 Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204, 116 S. E. 810 (1923).
53 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N.Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd and certified question
answered, 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E. 2d 708 (1937) (no opinion). See Note, 46 YALE L. J.
1055 (1937).
54 The Court of Appeals had already awarded an appraisal when an amendment inter alia,
provided for exchange of shares for a retirable stock. Matter of Silberkraus, 250 N. Y. 242,
165 N.E. 279 (1929), reversing 224 App. Div. 268, 229 N.Y. Supp. 735 (3d Dep't 1928).
See also Matter of Seiler, 239 App. Div. 400, 267 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1st Dep't 1933), and
comment on the Seiler case in 19 CoRNELL L. Q. 47o (1934).
55 249 App. Div. 181, 189, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932, 941.
56 206 P. 2d 206 (Okla. 1949).
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for its redemption. Shortly after the charter, the law was amended to
permit redeemable preferred stock. The charter was allowed to lapse by
mistake, and then was renewed. After the renewal, an amendment was
adopted, by what process was not stated, which called the preferred stock
for redemption at $100 and accrued dividends, a total of $105. The
court enjoined the amendment, holding that the statute revealed no in-
tention to make pre-existing stocks redeemable, and that the reserved
power, limited to matters in which the state had an interest, did not
authorize interference with the private rights between the stockholders
and the corporation and between the stockholders inter se. It is clear
that the court relied upon the contracts clause in reaching this result; its
quotations from other sources suggest that it relied upon the due process
and equal protection clauses as well. It plainly considered the amend-
ment unfair to the preferred stockholders:
The defendant corporation in this case has been very successful and
well managed, and no doubt it would be to the financial advantage of the
common stockholders to retire this preferred stock; but in its infancy, this
corporation sold preferred stock to the plaintiffs and a valid contract was
made with them, and the Legislature, the defendant corporation, and this
Court are without authority to deny to these plaintiffs their constitutional
rights 7
Under these decisions the right to a non-callable stock is of equal
dignity with the right to accrued dividends and is equally protected
against direct attack. The question then is whether the courts will allow
the majority, as in the accrued dividend cases, to exert pressure on the
minority to compel it to accept a redeemable stock." The most direct
57 Id. at 211.
58 The reference is to the practice of issuing a stock prior to an old preferred with
accrued dividends, and offering it to preferred stockholders who are willing to release their
accrued dividends. The result is to give those who assent to the amendment and give up
their accrued dividends a preference in assets and in dividends over those who refuse to
make the exchange, thus putting pressure on the latter to change their minds and make
the exchange. Not exchanging involves risk, as those who take the new stock become prior
to the dissenters upon liquidation. Matter of Duer, 270 N.Y. 343, 1 N.E. 2d 457 (1936).
"Voluntary" plans designed to induce the surrender of accrued dividends have often been
upheld. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923) ;
Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A. 2d 831 (Sup. 1941), affirm-
ing 15 A. 2d 169 (Del. Ch. 1940). The Ohio Supreme Court has sustained such a plan,
but indicated that it would permit dissenters to have an appraisal of their stock. Johnson
v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. 2d 127 (1938), affirming 30 N.E. 2d 1019 (Ohio
App. 1937). The New York courts have denied the dissenter even an appraisal under such
circumstances. Matter of Woodruff, 175 Misc. 819, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 679 (Sup. Ct., Monroe
County, 1941), aff'd without opinion, 262 App. Div. 814, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 756 (4th Dep't
1941); Longson v. Beaux-Arts Apts., 265 App. Div. 951, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 605 (2d Dep't
1942), a.f'd without opinion, 290 N.Y. 845, 50 N.E.2d 240 (1943). See also Matter of
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authority on this point is Johnson v. Lamprecht, 9 in which the Ohio court
sustained an amendment providing for a new prior stock, exchangeable
for the old preferred at the option of the holder. The object of the
amendment was to eliminate accrued dividends, but the new stock was
also retirable at $105; the court sustained the amendment on the ground
that it was only voluntary, indicating that it would have "serious doubts"
of the validity of a compulsory exchange which eliminated accrued divi-
dends and made stock callable. The New Jersey court also has sus-
tained, under a subsequent statute, an amendment which permitted pre-
ferred shareholders to exchange 40% of their holdings for bonds, a
change which, equally with the issue of prior stock, appears to put
pressure on dissenters. 60 Hence, it seems that the experience with accrued
dividends could be repeated with non-callable stock.
The tendency toward protection of the preferred stockholder, which is
more pronounced in these cases than in those involving accrued dividends,
is probably due to the fact that corporations have not used the volun-
Kinney, 279 N.Y. 423, 18 N.E. 2d 645 (1939), reversing 254 App. Div. 660, 4 N.Y. S. 2d
377 (1st Dep't 1938), in which the Court of Appeals denied an appraisal because of the
use of a prior stock to encourage the release of accrued dividends, but allowed it on account
of a reduction of capital. I have dealt with these plans more at length in another article
of this series. Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends, to be published in a forthcoming
issue of MIcH. L. REv.
59 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. 2d 127 (1938), affirming 30 N.E. 2d 1019 (Ohio App. 1937).
60 Berger v. U.S. Steel Corp., 63 N.J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902), revers-
ing 63 N. J. Eq. 506, 53 AU. 14 (Ch. 1902). See also U. S. Steel Corp. v. Hodge, 64 N. J.
Eq. 807, 54 AtU. 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903), reversing 64 N. J. Eq. 90, 53 At. 601 (Ch. 1902).
The amendment was sustained against the objections of a person who was probably a
common stockholder in Venner Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 116 Fed. 1012 (C. C. S.D. N.Y.
1902). See note 5, supra, for explanation of this case. A retirement of preferred stock was
also sustained against the objections of a common stockholder in Weidenfeld v. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co., 129 Fed. 305 (8th Cir. 1904).
But the New Jersey court enjoined a merger in Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 104
N.J. Eq. 490, 146 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) affirming on the opinion below 103 N.J.
Eq. 461, 143 At. 729 (Ch. 1928) on the ground that the shares for which the dissenters
would have to exchange were redeemable in three years. Hence the merger device cannot
be used in New Jersey to make stock redeemable, although a "voluntary" amendment is
valid. The rule of the Outwater case contrasts strangely with the decision in Windhurst v.
Central Leather Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 543, 138 At. 772 (Ch. 1927), and 105 N.J. Eq. 621,
149 At. 36 (Ch. 1930), aff'd 107 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 At. 402 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931),
sustaining a plan of merger which converted each old share of preferred stock and its 43%
of accrued dividends into half a share of new preferred stock, three-fourths of a share of
a subordinate preferred stock, and $5 in cash. The court relied partly on laches as justifi-
cation for the result.
Contrast Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 182 Misc. 323, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. County, 1943), sustaining a merger of parent and subsidiaries, although the old non-
callable preferred was exchanged for a new preferred callable at $115. The point, however,
was not discussed, and perhaps not argued.
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tary exchange technique so often. There is no reason to suppose that a
court which permits this method to be used to circumvent accrued divi-
dends would deny its use to evade an obligation to redeem or as a device
to make non-callable stock callable.6
III. LIQUIDATION PROVISIONS 2
The question of what matures a liquidation provision, so that the stock-
holders are entitled to enforce it, is beyond the scope of this article, which
is limited to the question of the majority's power to alter liquidation pro-
visions, whether or not they have matured. It is clear that such provisions
are contracts, resembling accrued dividends, and redemption provisions, in
that the performance of them is conditional upon future events. As with
redemption provisions, however, it is difficult to show any reason why the
state should have an interest in them so long as they do not interfere with
the rights of creditors. Indeed, since they only operate when the corpora-
tion is going out of business, the state can hardly claim that its interest in
keeping concerns going warrants meddling with them, unless one credits
the argument that money can be raised by increasing the attractions of
a class of stock to investors through change of liquidation rights.
Under the few cases now decided, liquidation provisions have received
almost no protection. The Ohio appellate court has sustained an amend-
ment which converted all the preferred stock into common,3 because
the statutes permitted it when the corporation was chartered, and because
appraisal was the exclusive remedy of dissenters. 4 The New York appel-
61 Yet the New Jersey court, which permitted the exchange of stock for bonds in the
Berger case (supra note 60) has given more protection than most against voluntary plans
attacking accrued dividends. See General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.,
97 N.J. Eq. 214, 127 Atl. 529 (Ch. 1925) and 97 N.J. Eq. 230, 127 AUt. 659 (Ch. 1925),
modified 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 AUt. 244 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925), and Buckley v. Cuban
American Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A. 2d 820 (Ch. 1940).
62 Some cases have presented necessarily a problem in the alteration of liquidation pro-
visions, but the decisions have been reached without consideration of such problems, perhaps
because the parties did not insist on their rights. See Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56
F. Supp. 418 (D. C. Del. 1944) ; United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F. 2d 923 (6th
Cir. 1935), cert. denied 295 U.S. 751 (1935); Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391,
190 AtI. 115 (Sup. 1936), reversing 21 Del. Ch. 13, 180 At. 584 (Ch. 1935).
6 Williams v. National Pump Corp., 46 Ohio App. 427, 188 N.E. 756 (1933), error
dismissed (for lack of debatable constitutional question), 126 Ohio St. 457, 186 N.E. 403
(1933). The statute relied on as permitting the amendment authorized changes in par value
and in the express terms and provisions of any class of shares.
64 Appraisal, as it now stands, is, however, not a satisfactory remedy in many respects.
See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARv. L. REV.
233 (1931), and Levy, Rights of Dissenting Stockholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15
COPNELL L.Q. 420 (1930).
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late division has approved an amendment which provided for exchange
of a $100 par value stock for one share of preferred stock with a par
value and liquidation preference of $25 and one-fourth of a share of
common stock; the court held that the preferred stockholder was not
even entitled to an appraisal under the New York statute which provided
for that remedy in cases of alterations of the "preferential rights" of the
shares.65 Against these decisions there is only Wessel v. Guantanamo
Sugar Co.,66 in which the amendment converted each share of preferred
stock and its accrued dividends into $40 of 5% debentures and 14 shares
of $5 par value common stock, while the common stock received two-
fifths of a share of new common for each share of old. The New Jersey
court held that this amendment was compulsory and for that reason in-
valid.6 Hence, as the cases stand, the Ohio court sustains such amend-
ments because of the appraisal statute, the New York court denies even
an appraisal if the amendment is voluntary, and the New Jersey court will
enjoin only if the amendment is compulsory.
A far more serious challenge to liquidation provisions is rapidly de-
veloping in the merger cases. Three cases under the Delaware statutes
and one in Ohio establish that by merging, the majority can change liqui-
dation provisions compulsorily. In Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,"8 the
Delaware chancery court sustained a merger with a wholly owned sub-
sidiary which converted each share of preferred stock with a liquida-
tion preference of $100 and accrued dividends into a share of preferred
stock with a liquidation preference of $50, and five shares of common
stock. The court relied in part on the transfer of voting control to the
preferred stock as showing the fairness of the action. The federal district
court has sustained under the Delaware law, an amendment which
65 Matter of Woodruff, 175 Misc. 819, 26 N.Y. S. 2d 679 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County,
1941), aff'd without opinion, 262 App. Div. 814, 28 N.Y. S. 2d 756 (4th Dep't 1941).
66 135 N.J. Eq. 506, 39 A. 2d 431 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944), affirming 134 N.J. Eq. 271,
35 A. 2d 215 (Ch. 1944).
67 The court, after enumerating the losses to the preferred stock, which included accrued
dividends, preferred future dividends, liquidation preferences, redemption and sinking fund
provisions, inter alia, said:
. . . For those contractual rights preferred stockholders are offered $40 debentures
carrying 5% interest and a share in $5 par new common stock with holders of the
present common stock, on a basis which will give to preferred stockholders 60% of
such new stock and 40% thereof to present common stockholders. Thus preferred
stockholders who are not now required to share in losses the defendant may sustain
until after the interests of common stockholders are exhausted, will be required to stand
60% of any such loss, and those common stockholders who have no present hope of
dividends will be enabled to share with the preferred stockholders immediately in
dividends to be declared out of a bookkeeping capital surplus of $2,609,346.95.
134 N. J. Eq. 271, 276, 35 A. 2d 215, 217-8 (1944).
68 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A. 2d 148 (Ch. 1943).
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changed the $60 liquidation preference of the stock to one share of class
B stock of a corporation which was purchasing all the assets of the
company. 9 The court rested its decision on the public interest in having
the sale executed and on the ground that the common stockholders would
not vote for the plan unless they received some securities from the trans-
action.70 Recently a Circuit Court of Appeals approved a merger with a
subsidiary, in which preferred stock with an express covenant to receive
110% of any amount by which it might be reduced, was changed to one
share of preferred stock with a stated value of $50 and five shares of
common stock.7 A lower court in Ohio has approved an amendment
changing the liquidation provisions of preferred stock to one-fourth of a
share of preferred class B, and one share of common stock, all in a cor-
poration which proposed to purchase the assets of the company.72 The
only authority found contrary to these is Copeland v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Co.,73 in which the preferred stock was entitled to share alike
with the common stock upon liquidation. The corporation proposed, upon
merger with another, to issue a preferred stock with a $25 par value,
entitled to $35 and accrued dividends on liquidation. The New Jersey
court enjoined the merger:
69 Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. C. Del. 1943).
70 . .. If the preferential right of $60 a share remains unaltered, it would be impossible
in this case to obtain the vote of the common stockholders in favor of the sale and
dissolution, because there could not possibly be any rational basis, under the circum-
stances, for the common stock voting in approval. One thing is certain. Nothing can
be accomplished, either in law or in life, by calling the recalcitrants names. The reality
of the situation confronting Postal's management called for some inducement to be
offered to the common stockholders to secure their favorable vote for the plan. It
seems to me of little moment whether that approval was voiced at one or two meetings.
The fact is something had to induce the common stockholders to come along. This
court and the Delaware courts have recognized the strategic position of common stock
to hamper the desires of the real owners of the equity of a corporation, and the tribute
which common stock exacts for its vote under reclassification and reorganization.
52 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D. C. Del. 1943).
71 Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories Inc., 163 F. 2d 804 (3d Cir. 1947), affirming 68
F. Supp. 209 (D. C. Del. 1946).
72 Daus v. Otis Steel Co., 11 Ohio Sup.,& C.P. Dec. 94 (Common Pleas, 1942).
73 84 N.J. Eq. 276, 94 AtI. 404 (Ch. 1915), aff'd on the opinion below, 85 N.J. Eq. 209,
95 Atl. 549 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915). In an earlier case, Beling v. American Tobacco Co.,
72 N.J. Eq. 32, 65 Atl. 725 (Ch. 1907), the court sustained a consolidation which replaced
the plaintiff's $10,000 of preferred stock with $13,333 face value of bonds. The court
answered the plaintiff's argument that the bonds would take away his chance to share in
the assets on dissolution if there should be more than enough to pay all the stock, by
saying that the common stock had control and the directors would see to it that there was
no more surplus on dissolution than would be needed to pay off all the stock. The decision
rests so much on laches and the impossibility of undoing the consolidation, that it is not a
very persuasive authority on the other point. Compare Doubleday v. Kalamazoo Citizens
Loan & Investment Co., 268 Mich. 280, 256 N.W. 337 (1934), in which the corporation
replaced the preferred stock with bonds. The court refused to hold, much later, that the
bonds were illegal but permitted the dissenter to exchange for them if he chose.
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It is obvious that whatever be the comparative market value of these
respective rights, they are different. If the actual value of the stock, and of
the property which the stock represents, should greatly exceed the par
value of all the stock, preferred and common, then the stockholder would,
as far as can now be seen, lose by the merger; if it should fall short of that
par value, he would gain.7 4
Under these authorities, except in New Jersey, if a compulsory amend-
ment would fail, which seems likely, a merger, perhaps with a controlled
subsidiary, would effectually alter an inconvenient liquidation preference.
Thus, voluntary amendments and mergers or sales of all assets are the
most likely line of attack for liquidation preferences, just as they are for
accrued dividends.
IV. SINKING FUND PROVISIONS
Preferred stock often contains covenants binding the corporation to
set aside a certain amount each year for protection or redemption of
the preferred stock. These provisions are clearly contractual; but they
are necessarily conditional, for, by analogy to the redemption cases, the
corporation could not use funds which were needed to pay debts for the
sinking fund. ' They raise numerous problems of construction, with
which the courts have dealt as with any other contract. Thus, in Longson
v. Beaux-Arts Apartments,7 16 the charter provided that the corporation
had to pay its whole earned surplus into a sinking fund so long as more
than 26,250 shares of preferred stock were outstanding. The court held
that the corporation had no duty, in years of profits, to make up pay-
ments for its years of defaults. In Wildermuth v. Lorain Coal and Dock
Co.,7 the charter provided for a sinking fund of eight cents per ton of
coal mined, and the court held that the corporation was obliged to make
up defaults before it could pay dividends on the common stock, and that
the preferred stockholders were entitled to an appraisal because of an
amendment that abolished the arrearages in the sinking fund. It seems
that the terms of the charters clearly justify this difference in interpreta-
tion.
Assuming the contractual nature of sinking funds, it is difficult to see
how they differ from accrued 'dividends or future dividends. All are
conditional upon the corporation's earning profits; all are priorities over
the common stock. The only difference in favor of sinking funds might
74 84 N. J. Eq. 276, 279, 94 AtI. 404, 405 (Ch. 1915).
75 See Note, 27 CoL. L. REv. 587, 591-2 (1927).
76 26S App. Div. 951, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 605 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd without opinion 290
N.Y. 845, 50 N. E. 2d 240 (1943).
77 138 Ohio St. 1, 32 N.E.2d 413 (1941).
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be that the preferred stockholders could compel a corporation to set
aside the sinking fund money, if it were not needed for debts, whereas
they cannot usually maintain an action for dividends or accrued divi-
dends. Yet, they cannot maintain an action for money out of the sinking
fund, unless they have some other contractual right to it, such as a re-
demption provision, and they can enjoin the payment of dividends on
common stock in violation of the dividend rights of the preferred stock-
holders, even when they cannot sue for their own dividends. Therefore,
sinking funds do not appear to be any more "vested" or unconditional
than dividend rates. The cases are not numerous enough to show whether
any different treatment is in store for them than has been accorded to
dividends.
The only case found involving the constitutionality of a subsequent
statute authorizing the removal of a sinking fund provision is Yoakam
v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,7 8 in which the amendment abrogated
the sinking fund of the old preferred stock and provided for a voluntary
exchange for new prior preferred. The court held that the sinking fund
could not be taken under the statute in force when the corporation was
chartered in Delaware, authorizing alteration of "preferences," because
the fund was more than a preference. The corporation then argued that
the amendment was authorized by a subsequent statute providing for
amendment of the "relative, participating, optional, or other special
rights of the shares." The court held that this, so far as it authorized
removal of the sinking fund, was beyond the scope of the state's reserved
power, reasoning that the state could not reserve power to impair the
obligation of a contract to which it was not a party.79 Expressing its sense
of the need for some limitation upon the scope of the reserved power,
the court suggested the following questions:
If a state were to pass an act reserving the right to alter or amend all
contracts subsequently entered into, whether between individuals or cor-
porations, would any one seriously urge its validity? Could a state by its own
act thus invalidate the clear intendment of article 1, sec. 10, of the Consti-
tution, by the theoretical reasoning that all contracts thereafter would be
made with this reservation read into them as a term and condition, and
would not, therefore, be impaired? 80
After this, the court concluded that the reserved power did not extend
to matters which the corporation shared in common with natural persons,
and which resulted from the law generally rather than from the grant of
78 34 F. 2d 533 (D. C. R.I. 1929). See disapproving comment, 15 CoRNELL L. Q. 279
(1930).
79 34 F. 2d 533, 545 (D. C. R. I. 1929).
80 Id. at 546.
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corporate entity. It stated that although the cases on the subject could
not be reconciled, the results of the decisions were consistent with reason-
able general principles."' It concluded with this attack upon the practical
effects of the amendment in the case before it:
To say that a general reservation on the part of the state of a right to
repeal or enact future amendments to the corporation law gave to the state
a power to authorize the cancellation of this agreement, is to disregard
every sound principle of law and to misconstrue legal history. As a matter
of fact, the state has repealed nothing, and by its amendments it purported
to extend the powers of the corporation. In this case the majority of the
first preferred stockholders have seized upon an apparent extension of
authority as a means by which to abrogate a corporate commitment to other
stockholders, to which commitment the state never was a party, and in
respect to which there has been no showing of public interest, and only a
meager, if any, showing that the abrogation of the sinking fund agreement
would enable the corporate entity to function better as an owner and oper-
ator of the Biltmore Hotel. 2
This seems to be as nearly unanswerable as the vagueness of con-
ceptions in the amendment field permits. However, if the premise upon
which this article is built, that there is no qualitative difference between
dividends, accrued dividends, and liquidation preferences of the shares,
is true, the reasoning extends over the whole of the amendments treated
in this article.
Besides this decision on the constitutional point, there are two others
in which the courts have refused to allow tampering with sinking funds.
In Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb,8 3 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that a power to classify and reclassify stock did not authorize
the abrogation of arrearages in a sinking fund. Again, in Wessel v.
Guantanamo Sugar Co.,84 the New Jersey court enjoined an amendment
which made many other changes including the elimination of a sinking
fund. 5 On the other hand, in Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co.,86 the Wis-
consin court held that a general amending power authorized reduction of
a sinking fund provision from 3% to 2%, and reduction of a quick
81 Id. at 546.
82 Id. at 547.
83 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E. 2d 618 (1941), modifying 260 App. Div. 860, 23 N.Y.S. 2d
557 (1st Dep't 1940) (no opinion), affirming 173 Misc. 782, 19 N.Y. S. 2d 117 (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. County 1940) appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 924, 24 N.Y. S. 2d 982 (1st Dep't 1940)
(no opinion). See also 165 Misc. 32, 299 N.Y. Supp. 960 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1937),
for denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings in the same case.
84 135 N.J. Eq. 506, 39 A. 2d 431 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944), affirming 134 N.J. Eq. 271,
35 A. 2d 215 (Ch. 1944).
85 The statute relied upon authorized the change of preferred to common stock and such
other amendment as might be desired.
86 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688 (1938).
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asset ratio from 120% to 60% of the par value of the preferred stock.
The court's justification was that the amendment was necessary to the
welfare of the corporation, which necessity was said to be proved by the
size of the majority that approved the amendment. In Haggard v. Lexing-
ton Utilities Co.,8 7 the charter provided that no dividends should be paid
on the common stock until the surplus equalled $13 per outstanding
preferred share. A charter amendment reduced the par value of the pre-
ferred stock from $100 to $25, but left its dividends and redemption
prices the same. The amendment also provided that dividends could be
paid on the common stock if there were a surplus of $13 per preferred
share, but that not more than 50% of the net earnings should be paid
in dividends on the common'until the surplus was $88 per preferred share.
The amendment then, reduced the sinking fund, with a contract to build
it up again in part, meanwhile making dividends available for the com-
mon stock. The court sustained it as a valid exercise of the power to
reduce capital.
The sinking fund's relative immunity from assault thus far seems to
be more the result of its scarcity in corporate charters than anything
peculiar in its legal nature. While approving the decision in the Yoakam
case that such obligations are beyond the reach of the state's reserved
power, one must remember the possibility that voluntary amendment and
merger could wreck a sinking fund as quickly as any other right of a
preferred stockholder.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The four kinds of provisions considered in this article all protect the
stockholder's ultimate interest in the property of the corporation. It is
true that his rights under all of them are conditional. The claims of
creditors may qualify his contracts for redemption or for sinking fund
security; reductions of capital may be affected by the rights of creditors
and of other classes of stock; his liquidation rights are, at least, subject
to the condition that there be a liquidation, which is contingent upon
many matters not under his personal control. The qualified nature of
his rights, however, should not obscure the fact that they are bargained
for, paid for, and are intended to protect him against certain foreseen
and well-known risks. The alteration of them shifts, or may shift, his
interest in property of the corporation to other classes of stockholders,--
a fact which requires that such alterations should be given very serious
consideration.
87 260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W.2d 84 (1935).
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(a) Constitutional Questions
When an amendment of these rights of the stockholder actually does
shift property interests, the action, if it is justified by a statute subse-
quent to the charter, seems to violate both the contracts and the due
process clauses of the Constitution, unless the public interest is strong
enough to warrant the effect upon private property. The enactment of
general statutes authorizing such amendments, supported by the pre-
sumption of constitutionality, may stand as a valid exercise of the police
or reserved powers. But the power exercised by the majority under such
statutes is in part a delegated power, coming from the state, and is applied
by a group interested in the subject matter, uncontrolled by any express
standards stated in the statute. Hence, the application of the statute in
any particular case may be attacked as unconstitutional, and the founda-
tion of such an attack is laid when the dissenter shows that the amend-
ment affects his interest in the property of the corporation. It seems
proper then to place on the proponents of the amendment the burden of
proving that the public interest requires the change in that particular
case. The proof exacted at this point should not be a generalization,
that such amendments are or may be necessary to corporate enterprise in
general. It should be a specific demonstration that that amendment is
required by the situation of that corporation. When the amendment, if
it stands, will take property without compensation, it seems that this
burden is not too severe.
The arguments presently offered for such amendments, both by the
proponents of plans and by courts sustaining them, fall far short of this
requirement. The majority vote in favor of the amendment is not, it is
submitted, a substitute for proof of the need for the amendment; it re-
sults more from the automatic operation of the proxy machine than from
the exercise of informed judgment by investors.88 Moreover, the claim
of a public interest in the amendment cases should be qualified by recog-
nizing the fact that vast numbers of corporations are chartered in states
where they have neither property nor stockholders. The usual practice
is to bring suits against amendments in the courts of the charter state,
which means that the public policy finally applied is that of a sovereign
which has no more than an official connection with the persons and prop-
erty involved.
88 Numerous writers have expressed this opinion. See Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point
in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REv. 1, 22, 23 (1942); Note, 36 CoL.
L. REv. 674, 675 (1936); Comment, 25 CoRNELL L.Q. 431, 436 (1940); Note, 52 HAv.
L. Rav. 1331, 1332 (1939); Note, 54 HAsv. L. Rav. 488, 489 (1941); Note, 26 IMNn. L.




These factors, it is submitted, show that a fresh and full consideration
of the constitutional question would be timely, and should result in less
willingness to sustain amendments under subsequent statutes on the
strength of easy generalizations. A comparison of the decisions giving
constitutional protection to irredeemable preferred stock and to sinking
fund provisions89 with those permitting alteration of accrued dividends
under subsequent statutes 0 creates serious doubt as to whether the courts
are aware of the similarities, analytical and practical, which underly the
different cases. A new approach to the constitutional problems should
lead to more consistent results.
(b) Statutory Construction
Amendments under statutes in force when the corporation is chartered
might be attacked constitutionally, on the ground that advance consent
to such amendments, considering the importance of investments in cor-
porate securities at the present day, violates the due process clause by
interfering with freedom of contract and with the security of ownership.
There is little hope, however, that any court will adopt such a position.91
Accordingly, a more promising approach is to urge that the broad
amending powers which are common today should not be construed as
authorizing amendments which shift property interests in the corporation.
The importance of some such principle, whether by way of equitable lim-
itation92 or otherwise, is increasing as more companies are chartered under
the newer statutes, so that constitutional protection becomes steadily less
possible. Some hope for the success of such a theory is derived from the
89 See the discussions, at pp. 17-18 et seq., supra and pp. 24-25 et seq., supra.
90 McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (Sup. Ct., 1945) ; Arstein
v. Robt. Reis and Co., 77 N. Y. S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County 1948), aff'd without
opinion, 273 App. Div. 963, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (lst Dep't 1948), leave to appeal denied 298
N. Y. 931, 81 N. E. 2d 335 (1948), cert. denied 335 U. S. 860 (1948). Contra: Keller v. Wil-
son & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. 1936). These decisions are discussed in another
article in this series. Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends, to be published in a forth-
coming issue of MIcH. L. REV.
9- There is a dictum suggesting that an injunction might issue under the Fourteenth
Amendment if a reclassification should cancel accrued dividends without adequate com-
pensation, in Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F. 2d 944, 953 (3d Cir. 1943),
bill of review denied 146 F. 2d 835 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945). This
is the only judicial indication I have found that a due process attack might be made upon
action taken under a statute in force when the corporation was chartered. There are dicta
that action under an existing statute might violate the contracts clause in Yoakam v. Provi-
dence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. 2d 533 (D.C. R.I. 1929), and in Pronick v. Spirits Dis-
tributing Co., 58 N.J. Eq. 97, 42 AtI. 586 (Ch. 1899), but the scarcity of such expressions
is almost an authority against them.
92 See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trus=t, 44 HAv. L. Rav. 1049 (1931).
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relative unanimity with which the courts have imposed equitable duties
upon the power to reduce capital. 3
The greatest need for limitation of absolute powers is arising now,
as the discussion has shown, in cases involving voluntary plans and mer-
gers. Voluntary plans rest upon the power to issue prior stock, which
can be used, by exchanging it for old shares, to put pressure upon dis-
senters. 4 General merger and consolidation statutes are the source of
a more dangerous power still, since those plans, if they are sustained,
are compulsory." The trend of the cases suggests that no interests of
the preferred stockholder are safe from such attacks; the only protec-
tion possible is the application by the courts of some theory which will
limit those powers.
"Equitable limitations" and "limited construction" are rather vague
guides to offer for administration in a case law system. Perhaps for this
reason, it has been suggested that a general standard of "fairness," by
analogy to the reorganization cases, should be applied to amendments
affecting accrued dividends. 6 It seems not unlikely that the same test
will be offered for application to the amendments considered in this article.
But the "fairness" test depends upon difficult and expensive valuations
of assets and of classes of stock, and it seems unlikely, at best, to pro-
duce any definite standard of comparison at all. The interests of stock-
holders are too valuable to be left to so tenuous a safeguard. There is not
the same urgent necessity that has compelled us, in cases of reorganiza-
tion and insolvency, to adopt so questionable a solution. Accordingly, it
seems worth while to look for a solution in some other direction.97
93 See the discussion, pp. 3-7 et seq., supra.
94 See, for example, the discussion of Johnson v. Lamprecht, pp. 18-19, supra. The
successful use of the voluntary plans to eliminate accrued dividends is discussed in note 58,
supra.
05 The successful use of mergers and consolidations to alter liquidation preferences is
discussed at pp. 21-23 et seq., supra. The same devices have been allowed to eliminate
accrued dividends. See, for example, Federal United Corporation v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch.
318, 11 A. 2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The cases are discussed in another article in this series.
Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends, to be published in a forthcoming issue of MscH.
L. RFnv.
90 Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HAv. L. Rxv. 780 (1942); Latty,
Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. Rav. 1
(1942).
97 The application of the "fairness" plan to accrued dividend alterations, and the diffi-
culties and shortcomings associated with it in those cases, are discussed in another article
in this series. Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends, to be published in a forthcoming
issue of Macu L. REV.
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(c) The Burden of Proof, and Legislative Action
There is another possibility which seems to avoid the difficulties in-
herent in the "fairness" test. The courts can administer the burden of
proof, in combination with limited construction or equitable limitations,
in such a way as to avoid the objectionable results which the cases now
reach. In an action to enjoin an amendment, it seems fair to require the
complaining stockholder to prove that the amendment alters his interest
in the corporation, or at least, so changes it that comparison of his po-
sition before and after the amendment is difficult or impossible. If the
dissenter can maintain this burden, the burden of proof should then be
put upon the majority to show that the condition of the corporation re-
quires an amendment, and to show that there is no feasible alternative
which would accomplish the objective without affecting the senior
securities or without affecting them so drastically." It is submitted that
this method of handling the cases would be easier to administer than
the "fairness" plan, would be less expensive than valuation of the assets
and of the various classes of securities, and would protect dissenters at
least as effectively. There is no doubt, too, that the courts would be
greatly aided if the amendment statutes were to state these issues and
expressly allocate the burdens of proof in the way here suggested.
The alternative to these suggestions, is, it seems, an adherence to the
present practice, which affords occasional protection by an appeal to
constitutional clauses or to equitable limitations, while voluntary plans,
mergers, and consolidations threaten to wipe out even these piecemeal
defenses. If there is any economic reason for having preferred stock in
the first place, there is also, it seems, every reason for keeping it preferred
after it is sold, and for preserving it from the losses which other classes
have bargained to bear. Unless protection, both legislative and judicial,
is given to it, it is greatly to be feared that preferred stock will become
as much a risk-bearing security as common stock is, and wil cease to
appeal to those investors who, for reasons best known to themselves, pre-
fer not to buy common stock.
98 The suggestion that the court review the alternatives to a plan of recapitalization
may not be well received. A memorandum filed by the S. E. C. in Doyle v. Milton, 73
F. Supp. 281 (S.D. N.Y. 1947), states that proxy solicitations need not, under its rules,
discuss alternatives to a plan, and the court, relying upon this, went on to state that such
an inquiry would be impractical. The court denied relief to a common stockholder who
was attacking a plan on the ground, inter alia, that it would result in the issuance of a
prior stock so as to give control to officers and directors of the company.
It is true that study of alternatives to the proposed plan would not be simple. But it
seems to be the only resource left, except the adoption of the "fairness" test, which seems
to be a more complicated method still.
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